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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to design an empirical test, and then to provide evidence 
consistent with this test, that enhances discussions as to when information asymmetry among 
investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. Recent literature 
emphasizes that information is not a separate factor in determining the cost of capital in perfect 
competition settings (e.g., Hughes, Liu, and Liu, 2007; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007). 
Further, other work shows that once one controls for average precision, information asymmetry 
has no effect on the cost of capital in perfect competition settings (Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia, 2010). What these papers leave unexamined, however, is whether information 
asymmetry has a separate effect on the cost of capital in settings that are less than perfectly 
competitive. To study this question, we examine expected returns in a setting where information 
asymmetry is most likely in evidence, in combination with a circumstance where information 
asymmetry is likely to exhibit the greatest effect on expected returns, as proxied by the level of 
competition for a firm’s shares.  
Perfect competition in a securities market refers to situations in which investors are price 
takers or, equivalently, when there are “horizontal demand curves for stocks” (Shleifer, 1986). A 
body of literature beginning with Hellwig (1980, p. 478) points out that the assumption that 
traders do not affect price implicitly relies on the assumption that the number of traders is very 
large (countably infinite). When demand curves are flat, demand has no effect on price. Each 
investor anticipates that neither his or her own trade, nor the trades of others, will have any effect 
on price. This assumption of flat demand curves implies that investors with any degree of 
knowledge about firms can trade as much as they wish without affecting prices.  
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When equity markets are imperfectly competitive, however, information asymmetry can 
have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Imperfect competition is typically characterized 
as each investor’s self-sustaining belief that he or she faces a downward-sloping demand curve 
or an upward-sloping price curve for firm shares (see, e.g., Kyle, 1989; Lambert and Verrecchia, 
2010), and this scenario occurs when the number of traders is finite.1 When the number of traders 
is finite, each investor recognizes the effect he or she has on price, and therefore price curves are 
upwardly sloping in demand. When price curves are upwardly sloping in demand, the curve for 
investors who are better informed is likely to be steeper than the curve for investors who are less 
well informed (in equilibrium). This results from the fact that the trades of better informed 
investors have a greater impact on price because of their superior knowledge. When investors 
with different levels of knowledge face different price curves, it is likely that information 
asymmetry, as a reflection of these different levels of knowledge, will manifest in price.2 
Perhaps consistent with this observation, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), and Hail and Leuz (2006), 
among others, show strong negative relations between proxies for information quality and 
proxies for the cost of capital. Thus, one way to reconcile the findings of these papers with those 
of Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) is to suggest that the 
former speaks to imperfect competition settings while the latter concerns primarily perfect 
competition settings. Our results provide evidence that the degree of market competition is an 
important conditioning variable that these and other empirical studies have not considered. 
                                                 
1
 Prices are upward-sloping when the demand curve is downward-sloping because an increase in investor demand 
shifts the demand curve outward, with the result that price increases. While upward-sloping prices may seem 
counterintuitive, they manifest in posted bid-ask spreads and depths for a given stock. A buy order for more shares 
than are offered at the quoted depth will increase the price above the quoted ask (i.e., the greater the demand, the 
higher the trade price rises in expectation). Shleifer (1986) shows that prices can be upward-sloping in extreme cases 
even for very large firms: prices increase when firms are first included in the S&P 500 index. 
2
 See, for example, the discussion in Lambert and Verrecchia (2010). 
- 3 - 
In this paper we explore further this possibility by introducing a proxy for the level of 
competition in a firm’s shares. While financial market competition is a well accepted economic 
concept, it has no natural proxy in market data. This problem notwithstanding, we use the 
number of investors in a firm as our proxy for the level of competition for a firm’s shares. Our 
rationale for this choice is that empirically we observe a wide range in the number of investors in 
U.S. firms, with some in the hundreds of thousands, thereby seemingly consistent with 
assumptions about perfect competition and price-taking behavior, but others in the hundreds, 
thereby less plausibly associated with perfect competition and price taking. When the number of 
investors in a firm is small, it is unreasonable for these investors to assume that their demand has 
no effect on price. Instead, here an investor anticipates that his or her demand will have an 
unfavorable impact on the prices at which his or her trades are executed. To the extent that 
better- (worse-) informed investors have a more (less) unfavorable impact on prices because of 
their superior (inferior) knowledge, levels of information asymmetry should manifest in prices.  
To find evidence of whether information asymmetry manifests in expected returns, our 
research design examines future returns in a setting where information asymmetry is most likely 
in evidence, in combination with a circumstance where information asymmetry is likely to have 
the greatest effect. Specifically, we sort firms based on their number of shareholders, as a proxy 
for the level of competition in their shares, and also sort on a proxy for information asymmetry. 
We find that when the number of shareholders is low, firms with high information asymmetry 
earn significantly higher excess returns than do firms with low information asymmetry. We also 
find that when the number of shareholders is high, there is no difference in returns for firms with 
high information asymmetry over firms with low information asymmetry. Finally, we present 
evidence that these findings are robust to different proxies for information asymmetry, different 
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ways of sorting, different proxies for the level of competition, different samples, and different 
models of expected returns. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
prior literature. Section 3 describes how we measure key variables and the research design for 
our empirical tests. Section 4 describes our sample. Section 5 presents our findings and 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper and offers caveats to our conclusions. 
 
2. Summary of Hypothesis and Review of Related Literature 
In summary of the foregoing, we expect information asymmetry to affect firms’ cost of 
capital when equity markets are imperfectly competitive. We summarize these predictions in 
Figure 1. When a firm has high (low) information asymmetry and when markets are imperfect, 
we predict that this firm has a relatively high (low) cost of capital. We therefore expect positive 
differences in the cost of capital between high and low information asymmetry firms in imperfect 
markets. On the other hand, when markets are perfect, regardless of the level of information 
asymmetry, no market participant affects price when he or she trades. Because no individual 
investor can affect price, differences in information across investors do not affect the cost of 
capital. In other words, under perfect competition (bottom row of Figure 1), market risk 
completely explains the cost of capital both when information asymmetry is low (column 2) and 
when it is high (column 3), so there is no difference (column 4).  
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Figure 1 
Predicted Excess Cost of Capital by Information Environment and Market Setting 
(Cost of Capital in Excess of That Expected, Given Market Risk) 
 
 Information Environment  
 
Market setting 
Low 
Information 
Asymmetry 
High 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Predicted 
COC difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Imperfect competition  
 
Low  High Positive 
 
Perfect competition  
 
Zero Zero None 
 
A body of literature beginning with Hellwig (1980, p. 478) points out that the assumption 
that traders do not affect price implicitly relies on the assumption that the number of traders is 
very large (countably infinite). When the number of traders is finite, each investor knows that he 
or she and every other investor pushes the price upward (downward) when buying (selling). 
When each investor has a self-sustaining belief that he or she faces an upwardly sloping price 
curve for shares of a firm, the market is imperfectly competitive (Kyle, 1989; Lambert and 
Verrecchia, 2010). The upwardly sloping nature of price reduces an investor’s willingness to 
trade and increases the cost of capital.3 If, in addition, there is information asymmetry, it 
increases the upward slope in price, resulting in adverse selection and a higher cost of capital. 
Adverse selection is a consequence of the fact that when price is upward-sloping, differences in 
the quality of information across investors affect the price at which trades are executed. In other 
words, here an individual investor presumes that when he or she trades in a firm’s shares, there is 
                                                 
3
 This cost of capital increase occurs even when there are no information differences (Kyle, 1989, and Lambert and 
Verrecchia, 2009), although the exact magnitude is an empirical matter. 
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an additional upward slope in price because others will presume that he or she has superior 
information. We summarize these predictions in the top row of Figure 1. When markets are 
imperfect, the cost of capital in excess of market risk factors is low when information asymmetry 
is low (column 2) and high when it is high (column 3), so that we predict a positive difference 
(column 4).  
As noted above, broadly speaking, a large prior body of literature in accounting and 
finance examines the unconditional relation between information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Easley et al., 
2002; Francis et al., 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Ogneva, 2008). Our 
study is most closely related to that of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), who show an 
unconditional relation between the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread and 
realized returns. Like them, we use the adverse component of the bid-ask spread as one of our 
measures of information asymmetry. The innovation of our paper is that we predict and find that 
the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital is conditional on the level of 
market competition, and we demonstrate this relation with a variety of proxies for information 
asymmetry. In other words, we predict and document that when equity markets are imperfectly 
competitive, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital.4  
When price is upwardly sloping in demand, a stock is less liquid. Our study is therefore 
also related the recent empirical literature on liquidity risk, although our assumption for why 
liquidity effects occur is very different. For example, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) assume 
perfect competition and predict that liquidity risk arises as the result of the correlation between a 
firm’s liquidity and overall market liquidity. Similarly, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) define 
                                                 
4
 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to predict and find this relation. A contemporaneous working 
paper by Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2010) also predicts and finds an interaction between proxies for market competition 
and proxies for information asymmetry.  
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liquidity risk as the covariation between a stock’s return and market liquidity. Their predictions 
are derived in part from Campbell, Grossman, and Wang’s (1993) perfect competition model in 
which time-varying risk aversion by a subset of traders implies that current order flow predicts 
future return reversals. In contrast to Campbell et al. (1993), we allow for imperfect competition 
so that a stock price’s sensitivity to order flow occurs because of upwardly sloping price curves.  
Finally, there is also a smaller body of literature on the unconditional relation between 
the number of shareholders in the firm and cost of capital (e.g., Merton, 1987).5 Similar to the 
theory discussed above, Merton also predicts that a lower number of shareholders is associated 
with higher expected returns. Merton’s intuition is similar to the notion in Kyle (1989) and 
Lambert and Verrecchia (2010) that as the number of shareholders increases, the impact of 
demand on price decreases, and the cost of capital declines. Merton’s model, however, is 
“unusual” in that it assumes that price curves are flat (and therefore it assumes that the number of 
investors is countably infinite), yet it still generates a prediction as to how a decrease in the 
number of shareholders increases expected returns.6  
  
3. Research Design 
In this section, we first provide an overview of our research design, then provide details 
of our hypothesis test, and finally describe how we measure variables.  
3.1. Overview of Research Design 
To test our hypothesis of a positive (no) relation between information asymmetry and the 
cost of capital when markets are imperfectly (perfectly) competitive, we first sort firms into five 
                                                 
5
 Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) test and find evidence for Merton’s (1987) predictions using a sample of Swedish 
firms. 
6
 Hellwig (1980) refers to a circumstance in which investors who are finite in number behave as if they have no 
effect on prices as the “schizophrenia” problem. 
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quintiles based on a proxy for the level of market competition. We expect the quintile with the 
lowest (highest) values of the proxy to most resemble imperfect (perfect) competition. Then we 
sort firms into five quintiles based on a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry. 
Although it is difficult to directly observe the level of information asymmetry, we expect the 
quintile with the lowest (highest) values of the proxy to have the least (most) information 
asymmetry. As illustrated above in Figure 1, in the quintile that is closest to imperfect 
competition, we predict that firms with a relatively high degree of information asymmetry have a 
higher risk-adjusted cost of capital than do firms with a low degree of information asymmetry. In 
the quintile that is closest to perfect competition, we predict that firms with a relatively high 
degree of information asymmetry have a risk-adjusted cost of capital that is no different from 
firms with a low degree of information asymmetry.    
As we will discuss in more detail in Section 3.2.3, we use both dependent sorts (in which 
we rank firms within a market competition quintile into information asymmetry quintiles) and 
independent sorts (in which we rank firms independently into market competition and 
information asymmetry quintiles and then take the intersection).  
After we sort firms into 25 (=5x5) portfolios each year, for each market competition 
quintile, we compute future monthly returns to the hedge portfolio that takes a long position in 
firms with the highest level of information asymmetry, and a short position in firms with the 
lowest level of information asymmetry. We use the three Fama and French (1993) factors to 
control for market risk and to describe the behavior of expected returns under the null hypothesis 
that information asymmetry has no effect on expected returns. This three-factor model of 
expected returns is widely used in the literature in both finance and accounting (e.g., Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; Aboody, Hughes, and Liu 2005; Francis et al., 2005; Petkova, 2006). 
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Specifically, for each market competition quintile, we estimate time-series regressions of the 
information asymmetry hedge portfolio returns on the three Fama-French factors: 
RH,t = aH + bH MKTRF + sH SMBt + hH HMLt + εp,t.     (1)  
where MKTRF, SMB, and HML are the Fama and French (1993) factors and RH is the return on 
the information asymmetry hedge portfolio for a given market competition quintile. The variable 
of interest is the estimated intercept aH. If aH is significantly greater than zero, firms with high 
information asymmetry earn higher risk-adjusted returns than do firms with low information 
asymmetry.  
3.2. Details of research design  
In this section, we detail our research design outlined in the previous subsection, 
introduce our proxies and discuss concerns about them, and discuss how we address these 
concerns in our tests.  
3.2.1. Specification of cost of capital tests 
We test our hypotheses about cost of capital by using future excess returns as a proxy for 
cost of capital. The main alternative to using future returns as a proxy for expected returns is to 
use an implied cost of capital measure, and we acknowledge that there is an ongoing debate in 
the literature on the relative merits of future returns versus implied cost of capital as a proxy for 
expected returns (e.g., Easton and Monahan, 2005; Guay, Kothari, and Shu, 2006; McInnis, 
2010). A chief interest of our study, however, is firms with low market competition. Because 
low-competition firms tend to have little to no analyst following, implied cost of capital 
estimates (for which analyst forecasts are required) cannot be calculated for most of these firms.7 
One of the drawbacks to using a firm’s realized returns to proxy for its expected return is that 
                                                 
7
 Panel C of Table 1 shows that few analysts follow firms in the lowest market competition quintile. 
- 10 - 
realized returns measure expected returns with noise. However, we attempt to mitigate concerns 
about noise in future returns by grouping firms into portfolios. 
In our tests, we form portfolios by sorting based on the variable(s) of interest and 
evaluate future excess returns to the portfolio using time-series regressions similar to Equation 
(1). This “calendar time portfolio” approach is used extensively in the finance literature to test 
asset pricing models (e.g., Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Fama and French, 1993; Fama and 
French, 2008). The primary advantages of this approach are that it does not assume that returns 
are linear in the variable of interest (i.e., the sort variable) and that it collapses the cross-section 
of returns (on a given date) into a single time-series observation, thereby alleviating concerns 
about cross-sectional dependence. This approach stands in contrast to traditional return 
regressions, where returns are regressed on firm characteristics. Such regressions assume 
linearity in the underlying firm characteristic, require standard error corrections for cross-
sectional dependence, and are known to be prone to outlier problems (e.g., Kraft, Leone, and 
Wasley, 2006; Fama and French, 2008). The one modification we make, however, to the 
standard calendar time portfolio approach is to compute the standard error for time-series 
regressions using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which allow for time-varying 
volatility.8 
In work closely related to ours, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) use portfolios sorted 
on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread to examine whether information 
asymmetry is associated with an increase in expected returns. Similarly, Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) use portfolios sorted on firms’ exposure to a liquidity factor as evidence to support their 
hypothesis that expected returns are higher when liquidity risk is higher. We acknowledge, 
however, that a significant hedge return in portfolio sorts may also be interpreted as evidence of 
                                                 
8
 We check the residuals of the regression for autocorrelation but find none. 
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mispricing, as in Sloan (1996) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001). We try to 
mitigate this alternative interpretation by using the widely used Fama-French model in our 
primary tests and by showing that our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications 
of expected returns. To ensure that our results are distinct from findings that liquidity risk may 
be a priced factor, in sensitivity tests that we describe in Section 5.5, we add Pastor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity factor and Sadka’s (2006) liquidity factor to the Fama-French 
factors. Similarly, to ensure that our results are distinct from short-term momentum, we add 
Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. Nevertheless, as with all asset pricing tests, our tests are 
joint tests of our hypotheses and of a correctly specified asset pricing model. 
A final issue is how to weight firms within each portfolio to calculate a monthly portfolio 
return. Following prior literature (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996), we use equal 
weights because our hypotheses are about the expected returns for a typical or average stock. If 
we instead used value-weighting, our return results would reflect expected returns for a large 
stock, not for a typical or average stock. Equal-weighted monthly returns are usually calculated 
by purchasing an equal-weighted portfolio, holding it for one month, and then rebalancing this 
portfolio so that it has equal weights at the start of the next month. The concern with this equal-
weighted returns calculation, however, is that frequent rebalancing can produce biased estimates 
of realized returns because of the bid-ask bounce (Blume and Stambaugh, 1983). To ensure that 
our results are conservative and not subject to this bias, we follow Blume and Stambaugh (1983) 
and compute returns to an equal-weighted portfolio that is rebalanced annually, or a “buy-and-
hold” portfolio. The portfolio is formed on June 30 based on an initial equal weighting, and the 
monthly “buy-and-hold” return is the portfolio’s percentage change in value, with dividends, for 
the month. This procedure yields monthly returns to an equal-weighted portfolio that is 
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rebalanced once at the beginning of each year.9 Note that annual rebalancing means that the 
transaction costs necessary to earn the reported abnormal return are paid only once a year 
because the portfolio turns over only once a year. 
3.2.2. Measures of market competition 
We use the number of shareholders as our primary measure of market competition. 
Specifically, we use the number of shareholders of record as of the fiscal year end, as firms 
report in their annual 10-K filings (Compustat Data #100). This annual measure is available for a 
large number of firms beginning in 1975. Among the limitations of this measure are that it is 
available only once per year and that it may be noisy because the SEC requires firms to “give the 
approximate number of shareholders of record,” a figure that may not include individual 
shareholders when shares are held in street name (Dyl and Elliott, 2006). 
The literature on imperfect competition implicitly assumes that the number of 
shareholders in a firm is given and that there are economic frictions or restrictions associated 
with a firm’s expansion of its shareholder base. Our theory predicts that if the number of 
shareholders increases, the slope of the price curve caused by any information asymmetry 
decreases, and the cost of capital decreases. This is the message that underlies Merton (1987): 
Firms can reduce their cost of capital by expanding their shareholder base and so have an 
incentive to do so. Thus, if one assumes that there are no restrictions to expanding the 
shareholder base, then presumably a firm will increase its shareholder base to the point that it 
becomes large. So as a practical matter, but consistent with the theory on imperfect competition, 
we (like Merton, 1987) also assume that there are unstated and/or unspecified reasons that some 
firms have a small shareholder base despite the benefits of expanding this base. In descriptive 
                                                 
9
 The coefficient on the low competition hedge portfolio is larger if we rebalance our portfolios at the monthly level 
rather than the annual level. For example, the abnormal returns to the ASC_spread hedge portfolio in the low market 
competition in Panel A of Table 3 (Table 4) increase from 1.04% (0.88%) per month to 1.16% (0.97%) per month.  
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analysis in Section 5.4, we will attempt to shed light on this issue by comparing characteristics of 
firms with low and high numbers of shareholders, and with low and high information 
asymmetry.  
The fact that we observe variation in the number of shareholders supports the assumption 
that there are costs to increasing ownership. Absent such costs, we would expect to observe all 
firms having similar numbers of shareholders. As Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) and 
Bushee and Miller (2007) point out, increasing firm visibility and ownership requires a costly 
and complex strategy of changes in disclosure, advertising, and media coverage. The tendency of 
individual investors to suffer from an attention effect, which results in their holding only a few 
firms in an undiversified portfolio, probably compounds such costs. From the shareholder’s 
perspective, the benefits to the increased share ownership primarily accrue to existing 
shareholders (in terms of higher prices), whereas new shareholders would bear the costs (e.g., 
transaction costs of taking a position and costs of being informed about the stock). Accordingly, 
while we do not seek to explain why some firms have more shareholders than others, variation in 
the number of shareholders does not seem to be out-of-equilibrium behavior. We take variation 
in share ownership as a given and examine whether this variation explains the relationship 
between information asymmetry and cost of capital. 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, a potential concern is that the number of shareholders and 
expected returns may be simultaneously determined. To see this concern, note that we can re-
express our hypothesis as the following: We expect information asymmetry to matter in 
imperfect markets (proxied by a small number of shareholders) because the demand impact on 
price is larger in these markets. Simultaneity can occur not only if a large number of 
shareholders cause a lower demand impact, but also if a higher demand impact of price causes a 
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lower number of shareholders (if certain investors are attracted to, say, more liquid stocks). A 
body of literature that includes Grullon et al. (2004) examines the determinants of the size of the 
firm’s shareholder base. Among other things, Grullon et al. (2004) find that measures of firm 
size and investor recognition (e.g., advertising expense, market value, and firm age) are 
positively associated with the number of shareholders, and a proxy for transactions costs (the 
reciprocal of price) is negatively associated with the number of shareholders. It is not clear 
whether this potential endogeneity affects our tests, since we are sorting firms into a relatively 
small number of groups and are primarily interested in the extreme groups. Second, any 
endogenous relation between the number of shareholders and expected returns will affect our 
future returns tests only if we have omitted a (correlated) variable from our expected returns 
model. As we discuss above, we use a number of asset pricing models to ensure that we have not 
omitted any factor relevant to future returns. In addition, we find that the size of the shareholder 
base is relatively time invariant. Firms in the lowest quintile in one year remain in the lowest 
quintile the next year. This finding suggests that a firm’s shareholder base is stable over time 
and, therefore, that firms are not altering their shareholder base in response to variations in the 
firm’s expected return.10  
Note that the number of shareholders can be a noisy proxy for the degree of market 
competition, because shares can be dispersed evenly among shareholders or concentrated so that 
one shareholder holds most of the shares. We acknowledge this limitation, but we note that if 
shareholders are more concentrated, one would expect more adverse selection if there is 
information asymmetry. Our information asymmetry proxies should capture this additional 
adverse selection. Since our hypothesis is related to the interaction between the degree of market 
                                                 
10
 When we use the lagged number of shareholders as an instrument for market competition, across all measures of 
information asymmetry, we find inferences that are identical to what we find below for both independent and 
dependent sorts.  
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competition and information asymmetry, the structure of our research design (i.e., dual portfolio 
sorts) should mitigate this concern. As another way of addressing concerns about noise in the 
number of shareholders, we report results below in which we refine our measure of market 
competition using high (low) trading volume as an additional means of identifying high (low) 
competition.  
3.2.3. Measures of information asymmetry 
 We use five measures of information asymmetry: two that are market-based and two that 
are accounting-based, in addition to analyst coverage.  
  Our market-based measures are (1) the adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread (ASC_spread), and (2) the bid-ask spread itself (Spread). Previous studies have used both 
measures to proxy for the degree of information asymmetry (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 
1996). ASC_spread measures the extent to which unexpected order flow affects prices and is 
increasing in information asymmetry. We estimate ASC_spread following Madhavan, 
Richardson, and Roomans (1997) (described in detail in the Appendix). Because the algorithm is 
very time-consuming to run, we measure ASC_spread for each firm once a year in June, using all 
intra-day data for that month. Similarly, we measure Spread for the month of June as the average 
bid-ask spread scaled by trade price and weighted by order size. ASC_spread is a component of 
the bid-ask spread. Thus, if ASC_spread is estimated accurately (inaccurately), Spread will be a 
more (less) noisy measure of information asymmetry.  
The advantage of ASC_spread and, to some extent, the Spread itself, is that it is a precise 
measure of the outcome of information asymmetry. In other words, if there is information 
asymmetry, it manifests as an increase in ASC_spread. As mentioned above, a concern with 
ASC_spread is that we expect it to be a function of both market competition (the number of 
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shareholders) and information asymmetry. Our dual sort research design addresses this concern 
in two ways. First, we use the lag values of ASC_spread and Spread as instruments for 
information asymmetry in our analyses. Second, we sort firms on both the number of 
shareholders and on ASC_spread. If ASC_spread is a function of both the number of 
shareholders and information asymmetry, then holding constant the number of shareholders, 
which is roughly the case within quintiles sorted first on the number of shareholders, any 
variation in the adverse selection component should be the result of variation in information 
asymmetry.  
A second concern with ASC_spread is that our hypothesis predicts that the slope of the 
price curve, and the effects of information asymmetry, diminish when market competition is 
high. We therefore expect that ASC_spread becomes small as the level of market competition 
increases. (As discussed below, our descriptive evidence in Table 1, Panel C is consistent with 
this expectation.) Thus, while we expect ASC_spread to have high power to detect information 
asymmetry when competition is low, it may have low power when competition is high. We 
address this concern in two ways. First, we use two measures (accrual quality and research and 
development expense) that capture the potential for information asymmetry but have a low 
correlation with our measure of market competition (Table 1 Panel B). Table 1, Panel C also 
shows that these measures retain more of their variation in the high market competition quintile, 
indicating that they have the potential to be powerful in detecting information asymmetry.  
Second, we use dual independent sorts, which assign firms to information asymmetry 
portfolios independent of their level of market competition. The benefit of independent sorts is 
that they tend to result in similar variation in information asymmetry across the market 
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competition portfolios. The cost is a reduction in power (because of sparsely populated cells) to 
the extent that the two sorting variables are correlated. 
 As discussed above, we use two accounting-based measures that capture the potential for 
information asymmetry. First, R&D is the ratio of annual research and development expense to 
sales. Prior research uses R&D expense to proxy for the presence of intangible assets, which are 
associated with higher information asymmetry (e.g. Barth and Kasznik, 1999; Barth, Kasznik, 
and McNichols, 2001). Second, we use scaled accruals quality (SAQ) to measure information 
asymmetry.11 Ogneva (2008) finds this measure to be superior to unscaled accruals quality in 
predicting future returns. Accruals quality and scaled accrual quality are both increasing in the 
unexplained variance of accruals, and prior research (e.g., Aboody et al., 2005; Francis et al., 
2005) suggests that when this variance is higher, earnings quality is lower and information 
asymmetry is higher. 
Finally, Analyst Coverage is the number of sell-side analysts issuing one-year-ahead 
earnings-per-share forecasts for the firm during the year according to the I/B/E/S Summary file. 
Prior research suggests that greater analyst coverage improves the information environment and 
therefore is associated with lower information asymmetry (e.g., Brennan and Subramanyam, 
1995). 
3.3. Timing of variable measurement  
The timing of our variable measurement is the same as that of Fama and French (1993), 
who rank firms into portfolios based on market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio. 
Fama and French (1993) form portfolios once a year at the end of June, compute future returns 
                                                 
11
 Ogneva (2008) estimates accruals quality as the standard deviation of residuals from the regression of total current 
accruals on lagged, current, and future cash flows plus the change in revenue and property, plant, and equipment. 
(See Francis et al., 2005, p. 302.) Ogneva (2008) lags this variable one period, to avoid look-ahead bias. SAQ is 
obtained by scaling AQ by the average of the absolute value of total accruals over the previous five years.  
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for the next 12 months, and then re-form portfolios at the end of the following June. They 
measure the market value of equity at the end of June of year t and compute book value (and all 
financial statement variables) as of the last fiscal year end in year t-1.  
Similarly, we form portfolios once a year at the end of June and compute future returns 
for the next 12 months. Because the number of shareholders, R&D, and SAQ are calculated from 
data reported in firms’ 10-K filings, we calculate these variables using data as of the last fiscal 
year end in year t-1. The market value of equity, the bid-ask spread (Spread), and its adverse 
selection component (ASC_spread) can be observed from market data, and we measure these 
variables each June. Recall that we use the lagged values of ASC_spread and Spread in our 
analyses. Finally, we measure Analyst Coverage as the number of sell-side analysts issuing a 
one-year-ahead earnings forecast during June of year t. 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
We construct our sample using data from Compustat, CRSP, ISSM, TAQ, and I/B/E/S. 
To be included in the sample, a firm must trade on a U.S. exchange (CRSP share codes 10, 11, 
and 12) and must have a non-missing return and market value on the CRSP monthly file in June 
of year t. We begin the sample in June 1976, when the number of shareholders becomes 
available on Compustat, and conclude in June 2005.12 This time frame allows for the inclusion of 
return data from CRSP from June 1976 to June 2006. The first and last columns of Panel A of 
Table 1 show the number of observations available each year for the number of shareholders 
from Compustat and for market value from CRSP.  
                                                 
12
 If a firm delists in a given month during the sample period, we follow Beaver, McNichols, and Price (2007) and 
compute the return by compounding the monthly return and the delisting return. Since we compute delisting returns, 
we have return observations for all firms in our sample as of June of year t. 
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The remaining columns of Panel A of Table 1 show the number of observations available 
for the remaining variables. We begin measuring the adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread (ASC_spread) and the bid-ask spread (Spread) in 1988, which is when intraday data for 
the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq becomes available from ISSM.13 ASC_spread is available for a 
smaller number of firms than is the bid-ask spread, because we require signed order flow from 
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to estimate ASC_spread. The TAQ data is available only for 
firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq, so we cannot compute ASC_spread for all firms 
for which we have the number of shareholders.  
To have a sample that covers a reasonable number of years and firms, for a given test, we 
require availability of only the test variables. For example, when we test our hypothesis about 
market competition and information asymmetry using Number of Shareholders and ASC_spread, 
we use all available firm-years for which we have estimates of both the Number of Shareholders 
and ASC_spread (i.e., from 1988 to 2005), but when we test the same hypothesis using number 
of analysts, we extend the sample period to 1976 to 2005 (i.e., we use all available firm-years for 
which we have estimates of both the Number of Shareholders and Analyst Coverage). 
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for our 
variables. The top half of Panel B presents descriptive statistics for all firm-years in the sample, 
and the bottom half presents a correlation matrix. We report Spearman (Pearson) correlations 
above (below) the diagonal. We focus on Spearman correlations because many of our variables 
are highly skewed and because our portfolios use ranked values. Because of our interest in cross-
sectional correlations between variables (e.g., market competition and information asymmetry), 
we compute annual correlations and report the mean of the annual correlations in the table. We 
                                                 
13
 NYSE and AMEX firms are available starting in 1984, but because these firms are typically much larger in terms 
of number of shareholders, we could not find a reasonable way to include them in the full time-series. 
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compute standard errors using the time-series standard deviation of the annual correlations, and 
we denote significant (at the 5% level, two-sided) correlations in bold.  
There is a positive correlation between ASC_spread and Spread, our two market-based 
proxies for information asymmetry. This large, positive correlation suggests that the variables 
capture a similar construct. Consistent with prior research that finds that Analyst Coverage is 
associated with lower information asymmetry, there is a large negative correlation between 
Analyst Coverage and both ASC_spread and Spread. The correlations between R&D and SAQ 
and the two market-based measures of information asymmetry are small, suggesting that the 
measures may be capturing different aspects of information asymmetry. Also note the negative 
correlation between the Number of Shareholders and ASC_spread. This finding is consistent 
with the predictions of models such as those from Kyle (1989) and Lambert and Verrecchia 
(2010), which show that as market competition increases, the slope of the demand curve (as 
proxied by ASC_spread) decreases. Finally, it is important to note the large positive correlation 
(0.54) between market value and the number of shareholders. While this correlation suggests a 
potential size effect, recall that we control for size by including the SMB factor in the factor 
regressions in all of our tests. We will also describe in sensitivity tests in Section 5.5.1 additional 
ways in which we ensure that our results are not simply capturing differences in returns that 
result from differences in firm size. 
In the final panel of Table 1, Panel C, we present descriptive statistics for the extreme 
quintiles (i.e., one and five) for each of the information asymmetry proxies for the extreme 
quintiles of market competition. In the left-hand columns, we show statistics where the portfolios 
have been formed by sorting first based on the number of shareholders (“dependent sorts”), and 
in the right-hand columns we show statistics where the portfolios have been formed by sorting 
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independently on the number of shareholders and on the information asymmetry variable, and 
intersecting the resulting quintile sorts (“independent sorts”). We sort each information 
asymmetry variable into five quintiles and report the median of the top and bottom quintiles. We 
compute these medians each year and then take the time-series average of these medians. The 
number of observations shown is the average annual number of observations in that portfolio. 
 Panel C reveals several patterns in the data. First, consistent with our prediction, and with 
the negative correlation shown in Panel B, we find that as market competition increases, the 
slope of the demand curve (as proxied by ASC_spread) decreases. There is a large and 
economically significant decrease in the median ASC_spread in both the low and high 
information asymmetry quintile when moving from the low competition to the high competition 
quintile. At the same time, we find that the variation in ASC_spread is decreasing in market 
competition. This decrease can be seen from the decrease in the Q5 - Q1 difference in median 
ASC_spread from 0.0102 in the low competition quintile to 0.0013 in the high competition 
quintile. Spread exhibits similar declines, but of a smaller magnitude. 
Although these declines are consistent with our hypothesis that the effects of information 
asymmetry on demand curves diminish as markets approach perfect competition, they suggest a 
possible alternative explanation for why we might find that information asymmetry is unrelated 
to expected returns when market competition is high. It is possible that information asymmetry 
affects returns when market competition is high, but that our market-based proxies cannot detect 
this effect because they exhibit little variation when market competition is high. As noted above, 
we address this concern in two ways. First, we also examine two accounting-based measures of 
the potential for information asymmetry (R&D and SAQ) and Analyst Coverage. In the case of 
SAQ, Panel C shows that there is more variation in SAQ when market competition is high. In 
- 22 - 
particular, the Q5 - Q1 difference in median SAQ increases from 1.001 in the low competition 
quintile to 1.258 in the high competition quintile. Second, we repeat our tests using independent 
sorts. Since ASC_spread is correlated with our proxy for market competition, independently 
sorting firms into portfolios holds constant the variation in information asymmetry within each 
market competition quintile. Consistent with this approach, Panel C shows that the Q5 - Q1 
difference in ASC_spread decreases by only 0.0007 when moving from the low competition 
quintile (0.0075) to the high competition quintile (0.0068). 
    
5. Results 
5.1. Information asymmetry and expected returns  
 In Table 2, we present excess returns for quintile portfolios sorted on each of our 
information asymmetry proxies. Although our hypothesis predicts a relation conditional on the 
level of market competition, we provide unconditional results in Table 2 as a benchmark for our 
later tests, and also to benchmark against prior work such as that of Brennan and Subramanyam 
(1996) and Ogneva (2008), which predict and find unconditional relations between information 
asymmetry proxies and expected returns.  
 Panel A on the left of Table 2 shows results for our market-based measures, and Panel B 
on the right shows results for our other measures. For each measure, we report excess monthly 
buy-and-hold returns (ap) for each quintile of the information asymmetry measure after 
controlling for market risk using the three Fama and French (1993) factors. We present the 
estimate of ap and the associated t-statistic. We also show the coefficient on each of the Fama-
French factors, but to conserve space, we do not report t-statistics but instead indicate 
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significance with asterisks. The column marked “hedge” indicates the portfolio difference 
between the high and low information asymmetry quintiles.  
 Of note are the results for ASC_spread and SAQ. For ASC_spread, the hedge portfolio 
difference between the fifth and first quintiles is positive and significant, and the coefficient 
indicates that this portfolio earns excess returns of 0.50% per month. The magnitude of this 
0.50% information asymmetry hedge portfolio return for our sample of NYSE, AMEX, and 
Nasdaq stocks from 1988 to 2006 is very similar to the 0.55% return reported in Brennan and 
Subramanyam (Table 4, 1996) for their sample of NYSE stocks from 1984 to 1991. 
 Second, when we use SAQ as the measure of information asymmetry, the 0.12% hedge 
portfolio difference between the fifth and first quintiles is not significant. This result stands in 
contrast to Ogneva’s (2008) finding of a significant return of 0.19% per month on an equal-
weighted SAQ hedge portfolio. However, we can replicate her results on our data if we employ 
equal weights and use the less conservative portfolio formation rule of rebalancing the portfolio 
each month. 
 Finally, the bottom right of the table shows that R&D Expense to Sales produces a 
positive and marginally significant (t-stat = 1.77; two-sided p-value = 0.08) hedge portfolio 
return. Spread and Analyst Coverage do not exhibit significant hedge portfolio returns. These 
results serve as a benchmark for the information asymmetry hedge portfolios partitioned on 
market competition in Panel B. 
 Also noteworthy in this table is that the Fama-French factors are significant in every 
portfolio. The R2s decrease across the information asymmetry portfolios, a finding consistent 
with the returns to high information asymmetry portfolios not being solely explained by the 
market factor, or size and book-to-market. Also of note, the SMB factor loadings display a nearly 
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monotonic increase in the level of information asymmetry. Since the SMB factor is constructed 
using a hedge portfolio that captures the return differential between small and large firms, this 
pattern in the factor loadings is consistent with our finding in Table 1, Panel B that information 
asymmetry is correlated with firm size.14 Moreover, to the extent that the SMB factor captures 
differences in returns of small versus large firms, allowing the SMB factor loadings to vary 
across information asymmetry portfolios ensures that our tests are not simply capturing 
differences in firm size.  
5.2. Relation between market competition, information asymmetry, and cost of capital 
In Tables 3 and 4, we present results of our portfolio tests of our predictions summarized 
in Figure 1. Tables 3 and 4 present the results when portfolios are formed using dependent and 
independent sorts, respectively. In each table, we show results for each of five alternative proxies 
for the degree of information asymmetry.  
To conduct the dependent sorts in Table 3, we first sort firm-years into five groups based 
on the number of shareholders, as a proxy for market competition, and then we further subdivide 
each of these groups into five groups by sorting on the given proxy for information asymmetry. 
The resulting 25 market competition-information asymmetry portfolios are approximately equal-
sized. The number of observations in the high and low portfolios for each proxy is shown in the 
left-hand side of Panel C of Table 1, as are the median values for the proxy.  
Table 3 shows the results of the information asymmetry hedge portfolio for each 
information asymmetry proxy. Recall that we expect a positive hedge return for the low 
competition portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, the hedge portfolio return for the lowest 
                                                 
14
 Note that this finding is consistent with, and similar to, the one that Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) report in 
their Table 2. In particular, they find that hedge portfolios that take a long (short) position in firms with low (high) 
earnings quality have significantly positive SMB factor and R2s as low as 5%. 
- 25 - 
market competition quintile is positive and significant for ASC_spread, Spread, SAQ, R&D, and 
Number of Analysts.  
Of the significant coefficients for the low competition portfolios, the magnitude ranges 
from 0.42% per month (5.08% per year) for SAQ to 1.04% per month (12.48% per year) for 
ASC_spread. While the magnitude of the ASC_spread coefficient in particular appears large, we 
note that Brennan and Subramanyam (1996) use essentially the same method and report a similar 
magnitude in their Table 3. For the smallest firms, they report a difference in monthly risk-
adjusted returns between firms with the highest and lowest adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread of 1.65%, which amounts to 19.80% on an annual basis. Because their focus is 
different from ours, Brennan and Subramanyam provide no formal test of this difference.  
Further, we address the robustness of the ASC_spread findings in sensitivity tests below.15 
Turning to the information asymmetry hedge portfolio in the high market competition 
quintile, we find that none of the hedge portfolios earn abnormal returns. In other words, there is 
no difference in risk-adjusted returns between firms with high and low information asymmetry 
when markets approximate perfect competition. Also of note, the factor loadings vary 
significantly between extreme portfolios, a finding that emphasizes the importance of computing 
risk-adjusting hedge portfolio returns.  
To conduct the independent sorts in Table 4, we independently sort firm-years into five 
groups based on the number of shareholders, as a proxy for market competition, and into five 
groups by sorting on the given proxy for information asymmetry. As shown in the right-hand 
columns of Table 1, Panel C, the resulting 25 market competition-information asymmetry 
portfolios differ in size. The number of observations in the high and low portfolios for each 
                                                 
15
 The SAS portfolio sort code that we used to generate the results in Tables 3 and 4 is available from the authors 
upon request. 
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proxy is shown in the right-hand side of Panel C of Table 1, as are the median values for the 
proxy. 
Results of the independent sorts in Table 4 are in general similar to those in Table 3. Of 
the significant coefficients for the low competition portfolios, the magnitude ranges from 0.43% 
per month (5.12% per year) for SAQ to 0.88% per month (10.56% per year) for ASC_spread. The 
one difference is the Analyst Coverage hedge portfolio, which does not earn positive risk-
adjusted returns, regardless of the level of market competition. Further, note that the factor 
loadings for proxies in Table 4, Panel B are similar to the corresponding loadings in Table 3, 
Panel B. For example, in the low competition portfolios formed on SAQ, because the factor 
loadings are similar for the high and low information asymmetry portfolios, they have very little 
explanatory power for the hedge portfolio.  
Collectively, the results in Tables 3 and 4 strongly support our hypothesis that 
information asymmetry affects (does not affect) the cost of capital in the least (most) competitive 
markets.  
5.3 Refinement of proxy for market competition 
 Although the number of shareholders is the measure of market competition identified in 
theoretical market microstructure models such as those from Kyle (1989) and Lambert and 
Verrecchia (2010), an empirical concern is that this proxy does not distinguish between investors 
who actively trade in the stock, and thus supply liquidity to the market, and passive investors 
who buy and hold. To address this concern, we refine our market competition proxy to account 
not only for differences in the number of shareholders, but also for differences in the level of 
trading activity in firms’ shares. We measure trading activity as share turnover, calculated as 
annual volume in year t divided by average shares outstanding. If greater turnover is associated 
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with a more competitive market, then firms that have a high (low) number of shareholders and 
high (low) turnover are relatively the most (least) competitive. To capture this idea, we adapt our 
portfolio sort procedure by introducing an additional sort based on turnover. As before, we first 
sort firm-years into five quintiles based on the number of shareholders, but now within each 
market competition quintile, we sort firms into two groups based on turnover.16 This process 
produces 10 market competition quintiles, which we then sort into five information asymmetry 
portfolios, for a total of 50 (= 5 x 2 x 5) portfolios.  
 Table 5 presents the results of the information asymmetry hedge portfolio according to 
whether the number of shareholders and trading volume are low and high. For parsimony, we 
show only the lowest and highest shareholder quintiles. To indicate the lower (higher) 
competition portfolios, we shade the low shareholder, low turnover (high shareholder, high 
turnover) portfolios. For all five proxies for information asymmetry, the dependent sort results in 
Panel A show significant excess returns for the information asymmetry hedge portfolio when 
both the number of shareholders is low and trading volume is low. The magnitude of these 
returns ranges from 0.57% for SAQ to 1.01% for Analyst Coverage. In contrast, when the 
number of shareholders is low but trading volume is high, only the two accounting-based proxies 
for information asymmetry (SAQ and R&D) produce significant abnormal returns. We find 
similar results when we independently sort firms into market competition and information 
asymmetry portfolios in Panel B of Table 5. 
 As in our previous tests, the information asymmetry hedge portfolios generally do not 
produce significant abnormal returns when the level of market competition is high, regardless of 
the level of trading in the firm’s shares. The one exception is R&D, which produces a positive 
information asymmetry hedge portfolio when both the number of shareholders and trading 
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 We thank the referee for suggesting this test. 
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volume are high. The significant hedge portfolio return for R&D in the highest competition 
portfolio (i.e., the high shareholder, high turnover portfolio) is the one piece of evidence we find 
that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that information asymmetry does not manifest in high 
competition settings.  
5.4. Comparison of high and low information asymmetry firms 
 The results so far support our prediction that when market competition is low, firms with 
high information asymmetry have a higher cost of capital – in fact, roughly 12.5% higher when 
information asymmetry is measured using a dependent sort on ASC_spread as shown in Table 3. 
Although we predict that these firms will have a higher cost of capital, it is natural to wonder 
whether the behavior of these firms is consistent with their higher cost of capital. To shed light 
on this question, in Table 6 we compare proxies for these firms’ size and risk, valuation, trading 
costs, uses of capital, sources of capital, and disclosure/visibility. As we do this, however, we 
emphasize that the theory we test in this paper takes information asymmetry and market 
competition as a given and is not a corporate finance or disclosure theory that predicts how firms 
optimize their investments and capital costs. Therefore, our analysis in Table 6 should be viewed 
as descriptive.  
 Since both our theory and our evidence suggest that differences in cost of capital manifest 
when market competition is low, in Table 6 we focus on the low and high information 
asymmetry portfolios within the low market competition quintile (first three columns). For 
parsimony, and because the magnitude of the hedge portfolio return for this proxy is largest, we 
focus on portfolios formed using dependent sorts on ASC_spread (Table 3).17 As a benchmark, 
we also show the high market competition quintile (last three columns). For each competition 
quintile, the first column shows values for the low information asymmetry (“LIA”) quintile and 
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 We obtain consistent results with the other information asymmetry measures and when we use independent sorts. 
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the second column for the high information asymmetry (“HIA”) quintile, while the third column 
shows the difference and significance level. We present in the table a mixture of ex ante (i.e., for 
the year ended June 30 of year t) and ex post (i.e., for the year ended June 30 of year t+1) results. 
As in prior tables, for the variables shown, we compute the quintile median for each variable for 
each year and then compute the average annual median.  
 The first row reports the excess return from Panel B of Table 3 and annualizes it as a 
reminder that the HIA firms have a 12.5% excess cost of capital. The next three rows compare 
size and risk. Consistent with the factor loadings in Table 3, Panel B, firms in the HIA quintile 
are smaller and have lower beta and higher book-to-market. Consistent with the evidence that 
these firms face a higher cost of capital, the next row shows that HIA stocks have a significantly 
lower valuation than LIA stocks when the market is least competitive. The market-to-book asset 
ratio, a common proxy for the valuation measure Tobin’s Q (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003), is 33% lower for the HIA group. By contrast, there is no difference in valuation when the 
market is most competitive. The following rows show that investors who buy or sell HIA stocks 
pay much higher trading costs as proxied by the ASC_spread and bid-ask spread. Indeed, simply 
paying the round-trip spread costs 4% of the 12.5% excess return associated with the firms in the 
low competition quintile.  
 The higher book-to-market ratio and lower Tobin’s Q of HIA firms suggest lower growth 
opportunities for the HIA firms (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992). Consistent with lower growth 
opportunities and higher capital costs, the HIA firms undertake significantly less new investment 
and pay lower dividends (as proxied by Dividend Yield) than do their low market competition 
counterparts with low levels of information asymmetry. Consistent with differences in 
information asymmetry affecting capital costs only in low competition stocks, we find that HIA 
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firms spend significantly less on new investment than LIA firms do when the market is least 
competitive, and we find no difference in new investment when the market is most competitive.  
We also find that when the market is least competitive, HIA firms issue significantly less debt 
and equity in than LIA firms do, but that when the market is most competitive, HIA firms issue 
significantly more equity than LIA firms do.18 Collectively, these differences suggest that in 
imperfect markets, high information asymmetry firms face higher costs of capital and scarcer 
financing.  
 The bottom rows of Table 6 show that the HIA firms issue significantly fewer 
management forecasts both contemporaneously and during the next year. At first, it seems 
puzzling that managers would not seek to minimize their cost of capital by providing more 
information in the form of earnings forecasts. But perhaps it should not be viewed as such: 
Disclosure is costly, and firms with low growth options may rationally choose not to incur the 
costs associated with reducing information asymmetry. In other words, this finding may suggest 
that the difference in cost of capital across high and low information asymmetry firms when 
market competition is low is, in fact, an equilibrium result: Firms may choose to have high 
information asymmetry because the costs of reducing this asymmetry are greater than the 
benefits in terms of reducing the cost of capital.  
5.5. Sensitivity analysis 
 In this section we describe sensitivity analyses. Here as well for parsimony, and because 
the magnitude of the result is largest, we focus on portfolios formed using dependent and 
                                                 
18
 Following Chen and Zhang (2010), we measure equity offerings as the percentage change in split-adjusted shares 
outstanding over the next fiscal year. Similarly, we measure debt offerings as the percentage change in long-term 
debt over the next fiscal year. 
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independent sorts on ASC_spread. We emphasize, however, that all of the results for our other 
proxies are robust to these sensitivity tests.19 
5.5.1. Alternative samples 
Panels A and B of Table 7 present sensitivity analyses of our primary results where we 
calculate the returns to dual dependent and independent sorts. The first column of each panel 
replicates the information asymmetry hedge on ASC_spread from Tables 3 and 4 for comparison. 
The second column presents portfolio returns excluding all stocks with a price of less than $5. 
This is another way, in addition to our use of buy-and-hold returns, of ensuring that 
microstructure effects of thinly traded firms do not drive our results, and it provides some 
comfort that microcap firms that are not representative of the population of investable shares also 
do not drive our results. Results in both Panels A and B are consistent: The hedge portfolio 
return for the lowest market competition quintile is positive and significant, and the hedge 
portfolio return for the highest quintile of market competition is not significantly greater than 
zero. The third column shows hedge portfolio returns when we restrict the sample to the period 
after June 2001, when the decimalization of share prices was instituted on the NYSE. We again 
find that the hedge portfolio return for the low market competition quintile is positive and 
significant, and that the hedge portfolio return in the high market competition quintile is 
indistinguishable from zero. Both findings are consistent with our predictions. Moreover, these 
results are important because this more recent period, during which bid-ask spreads fell and 
trading practices changed greatly, is likely to be more similar to U.S. capital markets going 
forward, and shows that our results are not an artifact of the pre-decimalization period.   
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 The one exception is the post-decimalization tests below, which are not applicable to SAQ, R&D, and Analyst 
Coverage. 
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In the final two columns of both panels of Table 7, we attempt to address the potential 
concern that computing portfolio returns relative to the Fama-French factors does not adequately 
control for the size effect. Our primary proxy for market competition (i.e., number of 
shareholders) is strongly positively correlated with market value, and some of our proxies for 
information asymmetry (e.g., ASC_spread) are strongly negatively correlated with market value. 
A potential concern is that sorting firms according to the number of shareholders is simply 
capturing a size effect. As a first approach, we begin with the same sort of firms on number of 
shareholders and ASC_spread as shown in the first column. Then we sort firms on market value 
and delete the smallest and largest 20% of firms in the sample (i.e., the top and bottom quintile 
when ranked on market value). If the market competition hedge portfolio returns are induced by 
an implicit sort on size, removing the extreme size portfolios should eliminate the excess returns 
between the quintile portfolios with the largest and the smallest number of shareholders. The 
fourth column shows that the information asymmetry hedge portfolio in the low market 
competition quintile remains significant. In the high market competition quintile, we find that the 
information asymmetry hedge portfolio is not different from zero. Both results are consistent 
with our predictions and suggest that our dual sort procedure is not simply capturing a size 
effect.20 
A related concern is that our dual sorts on ASC_spread may effectively sort firms within 
a given market competition quintile by size. To address this concern, in the fifth column we 
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 As another way of controlling for a potential omitted size effect, we measure the excess return on a stock by 
subtracting the return of a matching portfolio formed on size and book-to-market equity. The matching portfolios are 
the updated 25 VW size-B/M portfolios of Fama and French (1993). Using the size and book-to-market matching 
technique is potentially more robust to nonlinearities in the relation between size and book-to-market and returns 
(Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997). However, a weakness of the approach is that it does not control for 
the exposure to the market factor, which is significant in explaining the low competition information asymmetry 
hedge portfolios as shown in Panel B of Tables 3 and 4. We therefore use the matched excess returns and also 
control for the three Fama-French factors. Using this method, we find that information asymmetry hedge portfolio 
returns remain positive and significant in the low market competition quintile and are not different from zero in the 
high market competition quintile. 
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follow a similar approach as we did in the fourth column. We again begin with the same sort of 
firms on number of shareholders and ASC_spread as shown in the first column. Then within each 
market competition quintile, we sort firms on market value and delete the smallest and largest 
firms in each market competition quintile. If the adverse-selection hedge portfolios returns are 
induced by an implicit sort on size within market competition quintile, removing the extreme-
size portfolios should eliminate the excess returns. But Column 5 shows that the results are 
consistent in the low market competition quintile (as compared with Column 1) when we make 
this change. In addition, the information asymmetry hedge portfolio is again indistinguishable 
from zero in the high market competition quintile. Overall, the results in Table 7 show that our 
results are robust to a number of alternative samples. 
5.5.2. Alternative models of expected returns 
Although the Fama and French (1993) model is widely used as a model of expected 
returns, recent research has uncovered a number of other potential risk factors that appear to be 
useful in explaining the cross-section of stock returns. Table 8 presents the results from using 
three augmented versions of the Fama and French (1993) model, where each of the three 
columns augment the three-factor Fama and French (1993) model with either the Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, the Sadka (2006) liquidity factor, or Carhart’s (1997) 
momentum factor. The results are all similar to those in the first column, in which we replicate 
the information asymmetry hedge on ASC_spread from Tables 3 and 4 for comparison. In 
particular, for all three expected return models, we find that the information asymmetry hedge in 
the lowest market competition quintile is positive and significant and that the information 
asymmetry hedge in the highest market competition quintile is not significantly different from 
zero. All three columns are thus consistent with our predictions. The fact that our results are 
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robust to the inclusion of two alternative liquidity factors in the third and fourth columns 
suggests that our results are not due to the omission of known liquidity risk factors. 
5.5.3. Is idiosyncratic risk an alternative explanation? 
 In this paper, we focus on how information asymmetry affects the cost of capital in 
imperfect markets. Theory also suggests that as the number of shareholders becomes small, 
idiosyncratic risk can also affect the cost of capital, because idiosyncratic risk is not diversified 
away when there are small numbers of shareholders (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al, 
2007). Lambert and Verrecchia (2010) show that the effects of idiosyncratic risk are not linear 
and are bundled together with those of adverse selection; hence, it may be difficult to empirically 
separate the two effects.  
We conduct two sensitivity analyses to ensure that the fact that we do not control for 
idiosyncratic risk in our main tests does not affect our findings on information asymmetry. We 
first conduct tests analogous to our Table 3 and 4 sorts on information asymmetry. We form five 
quintiles based on the level of market competition and then sort into five quintiles based on 
idiosyncratic risk, where idiosyncratic risk is computed as in Ang et al. (2006). The returns to the 
idiosyncratic risk hedge portfolio for the low market competition quintile are not significantly 
different from zero. These results are inconsistent with idiosyncratic risk being an explanation 
for our information asymmetry results. Second, we take a similar approach as in the fifth column 
of Table 7. We again sort firms on the level of market competition and ASC_spread as shown in 
the first column of Table 7. Then within each market competition quintile, we sort firms on 
idiosyncratic risk and delete the 20% of firms with the smallest and largest values of 
idiosyncratic risk in each market competition quintile. If the information asymmetry hedge 
portfolio’s returns are induced by an implicit sort on idiosyncratic risk, removing the extreme 
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idiosyncratic risk portfolios should eliminate the excess returns. But we find that the risk-
adjusted returns to the information asymmetry hedge portfolio continue to be significant and 
consistent with our hypothesis. Overall, these sensitivity tests show no evidence that 
idiosyncratic risk is an explanation for our results on the relation between imperfect competition 
and information asymmetry. 
Collectively, the results in Tables 7 and 8 show that the results in Tables 3 and 4 are 
robust to alternative samples, restricted time periods, and alternative ways of calculating 
abnormal returns. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of 
capital. When markets are characterized by perfect competition, information asymmetry has no 
separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are less than perfectly competitive, however, 
as in Kyle (1989) and Lambert and Verrecchia (2010), market competition and information 
asymmetry affect the cost of capital beyond their effect on market risk. We test these predictions 
and find evidence supporting our predictions. In particular, we find an incremental effect of 
information asymmetry (beyond market risk) on the cost of capital when the degree of market 
competition is low and no effect of information asymmetry on the cost of capital when the 
degree of market competition is high. Collectively, our results suggest that future studies 
investigating the role of information asymmetry on the cost of capital should include the degree 
of market competition, which we show is an important conditioning variable in the relationship.  
 We caveat our results as follows. As to some extent illustrated by our study, at present 
our empirical and theoretical understanding of the cost of capital is still early. Our empirical tests 
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are based on realized returns. We calculate expected returns using the widely used Fama-French 
model in our primary tests and show that our results are robust to a number of alternative 
specifications of expected returns. Nevertheless, as with all asset-pricing tests, our tests are joint 
tests of our hypotheses and of a correctly specified asset pricing model. Implied cost of capital 
measures are an alternative proxy for expected returns, and there is an ongoing debate in the 
literature about the use of future returns versus implied cost of capital as a proxy for expected 
returns (e.g., Easton and Monahan, 2005; Guay, Kothari, and Shu, 2006; McInnis, 2010). A chief 
interest of our study, however, is firms with low market competition. Because low-competition 
firms tend to have little to no analyst following, implied cost of capital estimates (for which 
analyst forecasts are required) cannot be calculated for most of these firms. Finally, we find that 
when market competition is low, firms with high information asymmetry have a cost of capital 
that is from 5.08% to 12.48% higher than firms with low information asymmetry. Although we 
predict that these firms will have a higher cost of capital, this is an economically large difference 
in the cost of capital. We suggest that firms may choose to have high information asymmetry 
because the costs of reducing this asymmetry are greater than the benefits in terms of reducing 
their cost of capital. Understanding the magnitude and determinants of this trade-off is an 
important topic for future research. 
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Appendix 
Estimation of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread 
We estimate the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, ASC_spread, 
following Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). Prior literature (e.g., Greene and Smart, 
1999) uses this method to estimate the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. To 
estimate ASC_spread, we gather trade-by-trade and quote data from the Institute for the Study of 
Security Markets (ISSM) and the Trades and Automated Quotes (TAQ) database provided by the 
NYSE. We match trades and quotes using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm with a five-
second lag to determine the direction of the trade (i.e., buy or sell). We clean trades and quotes 
using the algorithm described in Appendix B of Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi (2008). Once trades are 
classified as either buyer- or seller-initiated, we estimate the following firm-specific regression: 
∆pt/pt-1 = ψ ∆Dt + λ (Dt – ρDt-1) + ut ,      (1) 
 
where pt is the transaction price, Dt is the sign of trade (+1 if buy and -1 if sell), and ρ is the 
AR(1) coefficient for Dt. The fitted λ in the above is ASC_spread. The advantage of the 
Madhavan et al. (1997) model is that it does not assume that price changes are monotonically 
increasing in signed transaction size, as do other models such as Glosten and Harris (1988). We 
are reluctant to make this assumption, because prior empirical work generally finds that the 
assumption is violated (e.g., Barclay and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001).21 Note that the only 
difference between the estimation procedure shown in Equation (1) and the one described in 
Madhavan et al. (1997) is that we have deflated the dependent variable by lagged price to allow 
                                                 
21
 Nevertheless, we also estimate the Glosten and Harris (1988) measure of the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread. This measure has a 0.77 (Spearman) correlation with the Madhavan et al. (1997) measure and 
produces similar inferences. For example, the abnormal returns to the ASC_spread hedge portfolio in the low market 
competition in Panel A of Table 3 are 0.61% per month (t-stat of 2.25). 
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for cross-sectional comparability.22 Because the Madhavan et al. (1997) model describes the 
evolution of transaction prices in a single firm, it was not intended to directly apply to a cross-
sectional setting where the price level varies across firms.23 
                                                 
22
 Absent this scaling, λ would depend on ∆pt, the change in price, and, hence, the price level of the firm. As a 
simple example, consider two firms, both with unexpected order flow (Dt – ρDt-1) equal to c (ignoring for the 
moment ∆Dt). In the first firm, price moves from 10 to 11, and in the second from 100 to 110. Despite identical 
changes in order flow, λ for the first firm is 1/c and λ for the second firm is 10/c. This example illustrates that, 
ceteris paribus, estimates of λ will differ by a factor of 10 because the price levels of the firms differ by a factor of 
10.  
23
 This concern about scaling also applies to other microstructure models and measures of ASC_spread (e.g., Glosten 
and Harris, 1988).  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for measures of market competition and information asymmetry. Panel A 
reports the annual number of observations available for each variable. Panel B reports the distribution of the 
variables used in the analysis, and their correlations. Bold indicates statistical significance at the 5% level (or lower). 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the extreme quintiles (i.e., one and five) for each of the information 
asymmetry proxies for the extreme quintiles of market competition. In the left-hand columns, we show statistics 
where the portfolios have been formed by sorting first based on the number of shareholders (“dependent sorts”), and 
in the right-hand columns we show statistics where the portfolios have been formed by sorting independently on the 
number of shareholders and on the information asymmetry variable, and intersecting the resulting quintile sorts 
(“independent sorts”). We sort each information asymmetry variable into five quintiles and report the median of the 
top and bottom quintiles. We compute these medians each year and then take the time-series average of these 
medians. The number of observations shown is the average annual number of observations in that portfolio. Year is 
the year of portfolio formation. Number of Shareholders (data #100) is the number of shareholders of record 
measured as of the firm’s fiscal year end. ASC_spread is the modified Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) 
measure of the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, estimated over the month of June.  Spread 
is the average bid-ask spread scaled by trade price, quoted on TAQ or ISSM and weighted by order size for the 
month of June. We use the lagged values of ASC_spread and Spread in our analyses. Analyst Coverage is the 
number of analysts issuing one-year-ahead earnings forecasts for the firm during the year according to the I/B/E/S 
Summary file. SAQ is scaled accruals quality calculated as the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals 
quality scaled by the average of the absolute value of total accruals over the previous five years. R&D is the ratio of 
research and development expense (data #46) to sales (data #12).  Market Value is the market capitalization (in 
millions of dollars) measured at the end of June. 
 
Panel A. Number of Observations by Year 
 
Year 
Number of  
Shareholders ASC_spread Spread 
Analyst 
Coverage SAQ R&D 
Market 
Value 
1976 3,239 - - 4,103 2,081 4,056 4,103 
1977 4,018 - - 4,177 2,177 4,120 4,177 
1978 3,959 - - 4,098 2,136 4,046 4,098 
1979 3,988 - - 4,106 2,139 4,041 4,106 
1980 3,972 - - 4,105 2,192 4,017 4,105 
1981 4,037 - - 4,356 2,320 4,236 4,356 
1982 4,229 - - 4,574 2,773 4,436 4,574 
1983 4,364 - - 4,822 2,730 4,592 4,822 
1984 4,646 - - 5,337 2,632 4,986 5,337 
1985 4,811 - - 5,418 2,489 5,050 5,418 
1986 4,806 - - 5,568 2,358 5,077 5,568 
1987 5,041 - - 6,060 2,251 5,439 6,060 
1988 5,214 3,451 4,006 6,239 2,204 5,485 6,239 
1989 5,139 3,258 3,950 6,172 2,178 5,333 6,172 
1990 5,080 3,231 3,911 6,190 2,251 5,299 6,190 
1991 5,038 3,200 3,926 6,202 2,374 5,296 6,202 
1992 5,102 1,748 1,912 6,507 2,448 5,522 6,507 
1993 5,307 3,992 4,964 6,928 2,627 5,777 6,928 
1994 5,850 1,958 2,054 7,785 2,881 7,026 7,785 
1995 6,076 5,012 5,912 7,936 2,933 7,234 7,936 
1996 6,208 5,220 6,016 8,352 2,954 7,609 8,352 
1997 6,670 5,760 6,496 8,631 2,914 7,924 8,631 
1998 6,623 5,914 6,558 8,522 2,868 7,838 8,522 
1999 6,177 6,121 6,490 8,111 2,791 7,396 8,111 
2000 5,986 5,847 6,149 8,054 2,802 7,411 8,054 
2001 5,560 5,582 5,891 7,505 2,765 6,901 7,505 
2002 5,092 5,262 5,536 7,023 2,845 6,377 7,023 
2003 4,665 4,926 5,119 6,563 3,040 5,901 6,563 
2004 4,528 4,760 4,846 6,469 3,118 5,719 6,469 
2005 4,528 4,713 4,781 6,511 3,043 5,693 6,511 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Distribution of Variables and Correlation Matrix 
 
Statistic Mean Std. Dev. P10 Median P90 
Number of Shareholders 17.54 1,274.36 0.238 1.651 17.869 
ASC_spread 0.004 0.089 0.000 0.001 0.007 
Spread 0.024 0.022 0.005 0.016 0.053 
Analyst Coverage 3.777 5.974 0.000 1.000 11.000 
SAQ 0.925 1.261 0.313 0.776 1.610 
R&D 0.765 33.477 0.000 0.000 0.128 
Market Value 1,058.510 7,419.770 6.504 80.400 1,425.570 
 
  Spearman Correlations 
  
       
 
 
Number of 
Shareholders ASC_spread Spread 
Analyst 
Coverage SAQ R&D 
Market 
Value 
Number of 
Shareholders  –0.48 –0.31 0.47 0.07 –0.07 0.54 
ASC_spread –0.17  0.66 –0.67 –0.03 0.00 –0.76 
Spread –0.20 0.51  –0.60 0.01 –0.01 –0.66 
Analyst 
Coverage 0.49 –0.36 –0.43  –0.03 0.04 0.70 
SAQ 0.07 –0.01 0.03 0.00  –0.05 0.01 
R&D  –0.03 –0.01 0.03 –0.04 0.02  0.00 
Pe
ar
so
n
 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
Market Value 0.62 –0.21 –0.27 0.70 0.04 –0.02  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Distribution of Information Asymmetry Variables by Market Competition Quintile 
 
ASC_spread Dependent Sort  ASC_spread Independent Sort 
Quintile 1 Quintile 5 Diff.  Quintile 1 Quintile 5 Diff. Quintile of Number of 
Shareholders 
Correlation 
With 
Number of 
Shareholders 
 
N Median N Median Q5–Q1  N Median N Median Q5–Q1 
1 –0.03  156 0.0007 156 0.0109 0.0102  44 0.0003 227 0.0078 0.0075 
5 –0.57  156 0.0002 156 0.0015 0.0013  444 0.0003 21 0.0071 0.0068 
 
Spread Dependent Sort  Spread Independent Sort 
Quintile 1 Quintile 5 Diff.  Quintile 1 Quintile 5 Diff. 
Quintile of 
Number of 
Shareholders 
Correlation 
With 
Number of 
Shareholders 
 
N Median N Median Q5–Q1  N Median N Median Q5–Q1 
1 0.00  169 0.0078 169 0.0586 0.0508  101 0.0058 209 0.0537 0.0479 
5 –0.36  169 0.0044 169 0.0266 0.0222  362 0.0057 49 0.0562 0.0505 
 
SAQ Dependent Sort  SAQ Independent Sort 
Quintile 1 Quintile 5 Diff.  Quintile 1 Quintile 5 Diff. 
Quintile of 
Number of 
Shareholders 
Correlation 
With 
Number of 
Shareholders 
 
N Median N Median Q5–Q1  N Median N Median Q5–Q1 
1 0.00  98 0.356 98 1.357 1.001  104 0.364 82 1.442 1.079 
5 0.08  98 0.384 98 1.642 1.258  86 0.363 118 1.524 1.161 
 
R&D Dependent Sort  R&D Independent Sort 
Quintile 1 Quintile 3 Diff.  Quintile 1 Quintile 3 Diff. 
Quintile of 
Number of 
Shareholders 
Correlation 
With 
Number of 
Shareholders 
 
N Median N Median Q3–Q1  N Median N Median Q3–Q1 
1 0.07  573 0.000 328 0.131 0.131  573 0.000 369 0.103 0.103 
5 0.05  608 0.000 328 0.038 0.038  608 0.000 297 0.051 0.051 
 
Analyst Coverage Dependent Sort  Analyst Coverage Independent Sort 
Quintile 1 Quintile 3 Diff.  Quintile 1 Quintile 3 Diff. 
Quintile of 
Number of 
Shareholders 
Correlation 
With 
Number of 
Shareholders 
 
N Median N Median Q3–Q1  N Median N Median Q3–Q1 
1 0.03  552 0.000 283 3.917 3.917  552 0.000 143 6.233 6.233 
5 0.41  328 1.967 335 19.700 17.733  122 0.000 723 12.517 12.517 
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Table 2. Information Asymmetry Portfolios 
 
We form five equal-weighted portfolios at the end of June of year t and compute monthly buy-and-hold returns for each portfolio. We rank firms into quintiles in 
June of year t based on one of five measures of information asymmetry: ASC_spread, Spread, SAQ, R&D, and Analyst Coverage. All variables are as defined in 
Table 1. Because of the large number of zero values for Analyst Coverage and R&D, these measures are ranked into terciles. To be included in a portfolio, the 
firm must have a non-missing return and market value on the CRSP monthly file in June of year t. α is the intercept from a Fama-French three-factor model 
estimated on monthly portfolio returns, and βMKTRF, βSMB, and βHML are the coefficients on the respective Fama-French factors. The ASC_spread and Spread 
portfolios span July 1988-June 2006 and contain, on average, 841 and 930 firms per portfolio per month, respectively. The Analyst Coverage, SAQ, and R&D 
portfolios span July 1976-June 2006 and contain, on average, 1,970, 503, and 1,792 firms per portfolio per month, respectively. *, **, and *** denote the 
significance of the factor loadings at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Market-Based Measures 
 Quintile of Information Asymmetry  
 1 2 3 4 5 Hedge 
 
ASC_spread 
α –0.09 –0.13 0.01 0.16 0.41 0.50 
t(α) (–1.33) (–1.96) (0.07) (1.11) (1.98) (2.29) 
β
MKTRF 1.07*** 1.10*** 1.02*** 0.95*** 0.81*** –0.26*** 
β
SMB
 0.34*** 0.82*** 1.13*** 1.19*** 1.20*** 0.86*** 
β
HML
 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.21** –0.10 
R2 95.0% 97.07% 95.56% 90.46% 78.82% 51.10% 
 
Spread 
α –0.07 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.31 
t(α) (–0.72) (0.03) (1.35) (1.64) (1.04) (1.17) 
β
MKTRF 1.08*** 0.99*** 0.94*** 0.90*** 0.85*** –0.23*** 
β
SMB
 0.47*** 0.76*** 1.03*** 1.23*** 1.21*** 0.74*** 
β
HML
 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.17** 0.28** –0.01 
R2 91.11% 97.24% 94.59% 88.91% 74.80% 33.92% 
 
Panel B. Other Measures 
 Quintile of Information Asymmetry  
 1 2 3 4 5 Hedge 
 
SAQ 
α 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.12 
t(α) (0.55) (0.40) (1.24) (0.55) (1.60) (1.37) 
β
MKTF 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.92*** –0.02 
β
SMB
 0.87*** 0.75*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.94*** 0.07 
β
HML
 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.20*** –0.01 
R2 95.02% 92.98% 93.74% 93.27% 91.06% 2.25% 
 
R&D 
α –0.11 –0.05 0.13 . . 0.24 
t(α) (–1.45) (–0.33) (1.16) . . (1.77) 
β
MKTRF 0.92*** 1.02*** 1.01*** . . 0.09** 
β
SMB
 0.69*** 0.76*** 1.22*** . . 0.53*** 
β
HML
 0.45*** 0.42*** –0.26*** . . –0.71*** 
R2 91.80% 79.17% 91.65% . . 67.08% 
 
Analyst Coverage 
α 0.03 –0.01 –0.09 . . –0.12 
t(α) (0.21) (–0.11) (–2.41) . . (–0.86) 
β
MKTRF 0.79*** 0.96*** 1.07*** . . 0.28*** 
β
SMB
 1.01*** 1.02*** 0.63*** . . –0.38*** 
β
HML
 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.22*** . . 0.02 
R2 82.49% 95.21% 98.06% . . 26.63% 
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Table 3. Information Asymmetry Portfolios Partitioned by Market Competition — 
Dependent Sorts 
 
We form 25 equal-weighted portfolios at the end of June of year t based on two-dimensional dependent sorts and 
compute monthly buy-and-hold returns for each portfolio. Firms are first ranked into quintiles based on Number of 
Shareholders (data #100), which is the number of shareholders of record measured as of the firm’s fiscal year end. 
Then, within each number of shareholder quintile, firms are ranked into five portfolios based on one of five 
measures of information asymmetry: ASC_spread, Spread, SAQ, R&D, and Analyst Coverage. Because of the large 
number of zero values for Analyst Coverage and R&D, these measures are ranked into terciles. All variables are as 
defined in Table 1. To be included in a portfolio, the firm must have a non-missing return and market value on the 
CRSP monthly file in June of year t. Panel A reports the Fama-French α for the information asymmetry hedge 
portfolio for each market competition quintile. Panel B reports Fama-French α and factor loadings for the extreme 
portfolios. α is the intercept from a Fama-French three-factor model estimated on monthly portfolio returns, and 
β
MKTRF
, β
SMB
, and βHML are the coefficients on the respective Fama-French factors. The ASC_spread and Spread 
portfolios span July 1988-June 2006 and contain, on average, 128 and 160 firms per portfolio per month, 
respectively. The Analyst Coverage, SAQ, and R&D portfolios span July 1976-June 2006 and contain, on average, 
336, 96, and 326 firms per portfolio per month, respectively. *, **, and *** denote the significance of the factor 
loadings at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Information Asymmetry Hedge Portfolios Partitioned by Market Competition 
 
 Measure of Information Asymmetry (hedge α) 
 
ASC_spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
Spread 
(Q5 – Q1) 
SAQ 
(Q5 – Q1) 
R&D 
(Q3 – Q1) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Q1 – Q3) 
1.04 0.65 0.42 0.51 0.38 1 (2.83) (1.93) (2.88) (2.85) (1.94) 
0.49 0.29 0.06 0.29 0.17 2 (1.96) (0.98) (0.39) (1.55) (1.09) 
0.53 0.41 –0.01 0.24 0.03 3 (1.89) (1.37) (–0.07) (1.68) (0.17) 
0.23 0.00 0.17 0.34 –0.05 4 (0.79) (0.01) (0.98) (2.48) (–0.25) 
0.03 –0.19 0.11 0.08 –0.09 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 (0.13) (–0.82) (0.89) (0.58) (–0.84) 
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Table 3. Information Asymmetry Portfolios Partitioned by Market Competition (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Detailed Estimates of Extreme Portfolio Returns 
 
 
   ASC_spread   
   Q1 Q5 Hedge 
α –0.36 0.68 1.04 
t(α) (–2.51) (2.00) (2.83) 
β
MKTRF
 1.26*** 0.80*** -0.46*** 
β
SMB
 0.87*** 1.53*** 0.66*** 
β
HML
 –0.04 –0.08 -0.04 
1 
R2 91.13% 71.13% 23.19% 
α –0.06 –0.03 0.03 
t(α) (–0.83) (–0.16) (0.13) 
β
MKTRF
 0.99*** 1.04*** 0.05 
β
SMB
 –0.06*** 1.24*** 1.31*** 
β
HML
 0.29*** 0.15* -0.13 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 92.17% 82.36% 72.82% 
 
   Spread  
   Q1 Q5 Hedge 
α –0.22 0.43 0.65 
t(α) (–1.34) (1.43) (1.93) 
β
MKTRF
 1.20*** 0.85*** –0.36*** 
β
SMB
 0.86*** 1.40*** 0.54*** 
β
HML
 –0.03 0.08 0.11 
1 
R2 88.20% 70.16% 17.37% 
α –0.08 –0.27 –0.19 
t(α) (–0.78) (–1.42) (–0.82) 
β
MKTRF
 1.08*** 1.09*** 0.01 
β
SMB
 0.04 1.19*** 1.15*** 
β
HML
 0.35*** 0.34*** –0.01 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 86.87% 83.86% 62.94% 
 
 
 
   SAQ   
   Q1 Q5 Hedge 
α 0.04 0.47 0.42 
t(α) (0.39) (3.09) (2.88) 
β
MKTRF
 0.82*** 0.85*** 0.03 
β
SMB
 1.10*** 1.25*** 0.15* 
β
HML
 0.18*** 0.09 –0.10 
1 
R2 86.84% 82.35% 5.82% 
α –0.06 –0.16 –0.11 
t(α) (–0.67) (–1.74) (–0.89) 
β
MKTRF
 0.95*** 1.03*** 0.08* 
β
SMB
 0.37*** 0.30*** –0.07 
β
HML
 0.24*** 0.41*** 0.17*** M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 89.81% 86.97% 6.49% 
 
   R&D  
   Q1 Q3 Hedge 
α –0.12 0.39 0.51 
t(α) (–1.04) (2.07) (2.85) 
β
MKTRF
 0.89*** 0.98*** 0.09 
β
SMB
 0.97*** 1.54*** 0.57*** 
β
HML
 0.26*** –0.61*** –0.87*** 
1 
R2 86.19% 86.26% 61.82% 
α –0.16 –0.08 0.08 
t(α) –2.86 –0.76 0.58 
β
MKTRF
 0.97*** 1.06*** 0.09* 
β
SMB
 0.28*** 0.67*** 0.39*** 
β
HML
 0.57*** –0.05 –0.62*** M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 93.75% 89.60% 58.81% 
 
   Analyst Coverage  
   Q1 Q3 Hedge 
α 0.28 –0.10 0.38 
t(α) (1.46) (–1.10) (1.94) 
β
MKTRF
 0.76*** 1.07*** –0.31*** 
β
SMB
 1.39*** 1.08*** 0.31** 
β
HML
 –0.11 –0.16*** 0.05 
1 
R2 76.82% 94.59% 14.87% 
α –0.18 –0.09 –0.09 
t(α) (–1.83) (–1.56) (–0.84) 
β
MKTRF
 0.89*** 1.03*** –0.14*** 
β
SMB
 0.94*** 0.00 0.94*** 
β
HML
 0.29*** 0.35*** –0.06 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 88.95% 94.32% 68.18% 
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Table 4. Information Asymmetry Portfolios Partitioned by Market Competition —  
Independent Sorts 
 
We form 25 equal-weighted portfolios at the end of June of year t based on two-dimensional dependent sorts and 
compute monthly buy-and-hold returns for each portfolio. Firms are first ranked into quintiles based on Number of 
Shareholders (data #100), which is the number of shareholders of record measured as of the firm’s fiscal year end.  
Then, independent of this ranking, firms are ranked into five portfolios based on one of six measures of information 
asymmetry: ASC_spread, Spread, SAQ, R&D, and Analyst Coverage. Because of the large number of zero values for 
Analyst Coverage and R&D, these measures are ranked into terciles. All variables are as defined in Table 1. To be 
included in a portfolio, the firm must have a non-missing return and market value on the CRSP monthly file in June 
of year t. Panel A reports the Fama-French α for the information asymmetry hedge portfolio for each market 
competition quintile. Panel B reports Fama-French α and factor loadings for the extreme portfolios. α is the intercept 
from a Fama-French three-factor model estimated on monthly portfolio returns, and βMKTRF, βSMB, and βHML are the 
coefficients on the respective Fama-French factors. *, **, and *** denote the significance of the factor loadings at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Information Asymmetry Hedge Portfolios Partitioned by Market Competition 
 
 Measure of Information Asymmetry (hedge α) 
 
ASC_spread 
(Q5-Q1) 
Spread 
(Q5 – Q1) 
SAQ 
(Q5 – Q1) 
R&D 
(Q3 – Q1) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Q1 – Q3) 
0.88 0.74 0.43 0.51 0.24 1 (2.31) (2.06) (2.93) (3.15) (1.06) 
0.46 0.21 0.09 0.28 0.13 2 (1.70) (0.65) (0.55) (1.64) (0.70) 
0.49 0.46 0.03 0.25 0.06 3 (1.71) (1.50) (0.18) (1.51) (0.31) 
0.37 –0.11 0.21 0.33 –0.10 4 (1.12) (–0.36) (1.24) (2.31) (–0.54) 
–0.10 –0.48 –0.16 0.13 –0.18 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 (–0.24) (–1.33) (–1.33) (0.81) (–1.18) 
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Table 4. Information Asymmetry Portfolios Partitioned by Market Competition (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Detailed Estimates of Extreme Portfolio Returns 
 
 
   ASC_spread   
   1 5 Hedge 
α –0.22 0.66 0.88 
t(α) (–0.86) (2.21) (2.31) 
β
MKTRF
 1.14*** 0.82*** –0.32*** 
β
SMB
 0.92*** 1.51*** 0.59*** 
β
HML
 0.04 –0.11 –0.15 
1 
R2 72.59 76.05 16.23 
α –0.06 –0.16 0.10 
t(α) (–1.06) (–0.40) (0.24) 
β
MKTRF
 1.01*** 0.97*** –0.04 
β
SMB
 0.10*** 1.26*** 1.16*** 
β
HML
 0.43*** 0.35** –0.08 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 94.39% 47.14% 29.91% 
 
   Spread Quintile  
   1 5 Hedge 
α –0.26 0.48 0.74 
t(α) (–1.32) (1.62) (2.06) 
β
MKTRF
 1.20*** 0.84*** –0.36*** 
β
SMB
 0.85*** 1.46*** 0.61*** 
β
HML
 –0.06 0.02 0.08 
1 
R2 84.20 73.51 18.87 
α –0.11 –0.59 –0.48 
t(α) (–1.36) (–1.76) (–1.33) 
β
MKTRF
 1.07*** 1.11*** 0.04 
β
SMB
 0.12*** 1.29*** 1.17*** 
β
HML
 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.03 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 90.87% 62.39% 38.38% 
 
 
 
   SAQ Quintile  
   1 5 Hedge 
α 0.08 0.51 0.43 
t(α) (0.73) (3.25) (2.93) 
β
MKTRF
 0.80*** 0.85*** 0.05 
β
SMB
 1.20*** 1.23*** 0.03 
β
HML
 0.09 0.08 –0.01 
1 
R2 87.52% 80.53% 0.20% 
α –0.01 –0.17 –0.06 
t(α) (–0.06) (–1.87) (–1.33) 
β
MKTRF
 0.94*** 1.04*** 0.10** 
β
SMB
 0.41*** 0.30*** –0.11** 
β
HML
 0.21*** 0.41*** 0.20*** M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 88.30% 88.49% 11.21% 
 
   R&D Quintile  
   1 5 Hedge 
α –0.11 0.40 0.51 
t(α) (–1.04) (2.31) (3.16) 
β
MKTRF
 0.89*** 0.95*** 0.06 
β
SMB
 0.97*** 1.50*** 0.53*** 
β
HML
 0.26*** –0.54*** –0.80*** 
1 
R2 86.19% 87.54% 62.04% 
α –0.16 –0.03 0.13 
t(α) (–2.86) (–0.26) (0.81) 
β
MKTRF
 0.97*** 1.07*** 0.10** 
β
SMB
 0.28*** 0.74*** 0.46*** 
β
HML
 0.57*** –0.16** –0.73*** M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 93.75% 87.27% 58.96% 
 
 
 
 
Analyst Coverage 
Quintile 
 
   1 5 Hedge 
α 0.29 0.05 0.24 
t(α) (1.46) (0.36) (1.06) 
β
MKTRF
 0.75*** 1.07*** –0.32*** 
β
SMB
 1.39*** 0.95*** 0.44*** 
β
HML
 –0.11 –0.17*** 0.06 
1 
R2 76.82% 89.40% 15.10% 
α –0.30 –0.12 0.18 
t(α) (–2.08) (–2.77) (1.19) 
β
MKTRF
 0.87*** 1.05*** 0.18*** 
β
SMB
 0.95*** 0.22*** –0.73*** 
β
HML
 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.09 M
ar
ke
t C
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
Qu
in
til
e 
5 
R2 76.42% 96.17% 29.91% 
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Table 5. Turnover-Based Refinement of Market Competition Measure 
 
This table presents results from using a turnover-base refinement of the market competition measure. We form 50 equal-weighted portfolios at the end of June of 
year t based on three-dimensional sorts (5 x 2 x 5) and compute monthly buy-and-hold returns for each portfolio. In Panel A, firms are first ranked into quintiles 
based on Number of Shareholders. Then, within each quintile, firms are ranked into two groups based on average share turnover over the 12 months ended June 
of year t, and five groups based on each of the five proxies for information asymmetry: ASC_spread, Spread, SAQ, R&D, and Analyst Coverage. Because of the 
large number of zero values for Analyst Coverage and R&D, these measures are ranked into terciles. All variables are as defined in Table 1. As indicated by the 
shaded cells, firms that have a high (low) number of shareholders and high (low) turnover are relatively most (least) competitive. We compute the Fama-French 
α for the information asymmetry hedge portfolio for the extreme number of shareholder and turnover portfolios. Panel A (Panel B) presents results from 
dependent (independent) sorts on the five information asymmetry proxies. Fama-French α is the intercept from a Fama-French three-factor model estimated on 
monthly portfolio returns. 
 
Panel A. Turnover-Based Refinement — Dependent Sorts 
 
  
ASC_spread 
(Q5 – Q1)  
Spread 
 (Q5 – Q1)  
SAQ 
(Q5 – Q1)  
R&D 
(Q3-Q1)  
Analyst 
Coverage 
 (Q1 – Q3) 
  
Turnover  Turnover  Turnover  Turnover  Turnover 
  High Low  High Low  High Low  High Low  High Low 
0.93 0.77  0.19 0.67  0.43 0.57  0.75 0.97  0.20 1.01 
Low  (1.61) (2.33)  (0.45) (1.71)  (1.70) (2.09)  (3.35) (2.61)  (0.50) (3.58) 
               
0.02 –0.13  –0.33 –0.21  –0.19 –0.13  0.51 0.02  –0.27 –0.03 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
High (0.05) (–0.69)  (–1.01) (–1.07)  (–1.11) (–0.94)  (2.33) (0.10)  (–1.31) (–0.22) 
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Table 5. Alternative Measures of Market Competition (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Turnover-Based Refinement — Independent Sorts 
 
  
ASC_spread 
(Q5 – Q1)  
Spread 
 (Q5 – Q1)  
SAQ 
(Q5 – Q1)  
R&D 
(Q3-Q1)  
Analyst 
Coverage 
 (Q1 – Q3) 
  
Turnover  Turnover  Turnover  Turnover  Turnover 
  High Low  High Low  High Low  High Low  High Low 
0.72 0.92  0.39 0.93  0.39 0.44  0.73 0.88  0.10 0.88 
Low  (1.35) (2.17)  (0.88) (2.17)  (1.43) (1.71)  (3.39) (2.76)  (0.26) (2.72) 
               
–0.32 –0.02  –1.09 –0.21  –0.26 –0.12  0.55 0.09  –0.45 0.01 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
High (–0.37) (–0.05)  (–1.87) (–0.56)  (–1.40) (–0.93)  (2.40) (0.51)  (–1.32) (0.07) 
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Table 6. Comparison of Proxies for Size and Risk, Valuation, Trading Costs, Uses of 
Capital, Sources of Capital, and Disclosure for High and Low Information Asymmetry 
Portfolios 
 
This table presents firm characteristics of the extreme portfolios formed using dependent sorts on ASC_spread 
partitioned by market competition. We show both the low market competition quintile (first and second columns) 
and the high competition quintile (fourth and fifth columns). We also present the differences between the 
ASC_spread quintiles (columns three and six) and denote the significance of the difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed) with *, **, and ***, respectively. Portfolio level characteristics are computed as the mean of the 
annual median values for each portfolio (except for the variables Market Competition Portfoliot+1 and Adverse 
Selection Portfoliot+1). Annualized excess returnt is the annualized abnormal return (or alpha) from a regression of 
monthly portfolio returns in excess of the market on the three Fama-French factors. Beta is the slope coefficient 
from a market model of monthly returns estimated over the previous 60 months. MVE is the market value of equity. 
B/M is the book-to-market ratio. The market-to-book assets ratio is the ratio of the market value of assets to book 
value of assets. ASC_spread is the modified Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) measure of the 
information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, estimated over the month of June. Spread is the average 
bid-ask spread scaled by trade price, quoted on TAQ or ISSM and weighted by order size for the month of June. 
Dividend Yield is annual dividends scaled by market value of equity. New Investment is the Richardson (2006) 
measure of new investment. %Change in Debt is the percentage change in long-term debt over the next fiscal year. 
%Change in Equity is calculated following Chen and Zhang (2010) as the percentage change in split-adjusted shares 
outstanding over the next fiscal year. %Issued Management Forecastt is the percentage of firms for which 
management issues an earnings forecast or earnings guidance according to First Call over the fiscal year. %Issued 
Management Forecastt+1 is the percentage of firms at which management issues an earnings forecast or earnings 
guidance according to First Call during the next fiscal year.  
 
 
Market Competition 
Quintile 1  
Market Competition 
Quintile 5 
 
ASC_spread 
Quintile 1 
ASC_spread 
Quintile 5 
 
Diff. 
 ASC_spread 
Quintile 1 
ASC_spread 
Quintile 5 Diff. 
    
 
   
Cost of capital:        
Annualized excess return –4.32% 8.16% 12.48%***  –0.72% –0.36% 0.36% 
        
Size and Risk:        
Betat 1.19 0.91 -0.28***  0.77 1.10 0.33*** 
MVEt 343 19 -324***  11658 373 -11285*** 
B/Mt 0.45 0.91 0.46***  0.63 0.77 0.14* 
        
Valuation:        
Market-to-book assets 
ratio
 t 1.74 1.16 -0.58***  1.38 1.24 -0.14 
        
Trading costs:        
ASC_spreadt 0.001 0.011 0.010***  0.000 0.001 0.001*** 
Spreadt 0.012 0.040 0.028***  0.010 0.018 0.008*** 
        
Uses of Capital:        
Dividend Yieldt+1 0.20% 0.00% -0.20%*  3.00% 1.40% -1.60%*** 
New Investment
 t+1 0.08 0.01 -0.07***  0.040 0.043 0.003 
        
Sources of Capital:        
% Change in Debtt+1  4.00% –5.16% -9.16%***  4.00% –0.20% -4.20%*** 
% Change in Equityt+1  1.40% 0.67% -0.73%***  0.00% 1.10% 1.10%*** 
        
Disclosure:        
%Issue Mgt. Forecastt 23.90% 5.76% -18.14%**  28.00% 11.90% -16.10%* 
%Issue Mgt. Forecastt+1 24.50% 5.84% -18.66%***  30.00% 13.00% -17.00%** 
 - 54 - 
Table 7. Robustness to Alternative Samples 
 
This table reports sensitivity analyses of the results presented in Panel A of Tables 3 and 4. We form 25 equal-
weighted portfolios at the end of June of year t based on two-dimensional sorts on Number of Shareholders and 
ASC_spread and compute monthly buy-and-hold returns for each portfolio. Firms are first ranked into quintiles 
based on Number of Shareholders (data #100) and then into quintiles based on ASC_spread. All variables are as 
defined in Table 1. Panel A (Panel B) presents results from dependent (independent sorts) on ASC_spread. We 
present the Fama-French α for the ASC_spread hedge portfolio for the extreme market competition quintiles. The 
first column in Panel A (Panel B) replicates the ASC_spread hedge portfolio results presented in Table 3 (Table 4). 
The second column presents results excluding those stocks with price less than $5 per share at the end of June of 
year t. The third column presents alphas for the period following the decimalization of stock prices by the NYSE 
(i.e., after June of 2001). In the fourth column, we delete the smallest and largest 20% of firms in the sample (i.e., 
the top and bottom quintile when ranked on market value). In the fifth column, within each market competition 
quintile, we delete the smallest and largest 20% of firms.  
 
Panel A. Hedge Portfolio Returns — Dependent Sorts 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Panel A  
ASC_spread 
hedge α 
(2) 
 
 
 
Excluding  
Stocks 
With Price 
< $5 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
Post-
Decimalization 
(6/2001) 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
Excluding 
Q1 and 
Q5 MV 
(5) 
 
Excluding 
Q1 and Q5 
MV by 
Num. of 
Sh. 
Quintile 
1.04 1.05 1.55 1.34 1.17 1 (2.83) (2.50) (2.86) (3.01) (2.66) 
0.03 -0.34 0.02 0.36 -0.28 
Market 
Competition 
Quintile 5 (0.13) (-2.60) (0.05) (0.70) (-1.46) 
 
 
Panel B. Hedge Portfolio Returns — Independent Sorts 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Panel A  
ASC_spread 
hedge α 
(2) 
 
 
 
Excluding  
Stocks 
With Price 
< $5 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
Post-
Decimalization 
(6/2001) 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
Excluding 
Q1 and 
Q5 MV 
(5) 
 
Excluding 
Q1 and Q5 
MV by 
Num. of 
Sh. 
Quintile 
0.88 1.05 1.16 1.30 1.03 1 (2.31) (2.72) (1.91) (2.62) (1.80) 
–0.10 -0.50 -0.20 0.47 0.34 
Market 
Competition 
Quintile 5 (–0.24) (-0.97) (-0.21) (1.00) (0.42) 
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Table 8. Robustness to Alternative Measures of Expected Returns 
 
This table reports sensitivity analyses of the results presented in Panel A of Tables 3 and 4. We form 25 equal-
weighted portfolios at the end of June of year t based on two-dimensional sorts on Number of Shareholders and 
ASC_spread and compute monthly buy-and-hold returns for each portfolio. Firms are first ranked into quintiles 
based on Number of Shareholders (data #100) and then into quintiles based on ASC_spread. All variables are as 
defined in Table 1. Panel A (Panel B) presents results from dependent (independent sorts) on ASC_spread. We 
present the Fama-French α for the ASC_spread hedge portfolio for the extreme market competition quintiles. The 
first column in Panel A (Panel B) replicates the ASC_spread hedge portfolio α using the Fama-French three-factor 
model presented in Table 3 (Table 4). The second, third, and fourth columns present α from the Fama-French three-
factor model augmented with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, the Sadka (2006) liquidity factor, 
and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Hedge Portfolio Returns — Dependent Sorts 
 
 
(1) 
 
Three Factor  
α 
 
 
Table 3  
Panel A  
(2) 
 
Four Factor  
α 
 
Liquidity 
Pastor- 
Stambaugh 
(3) 
 
Four Factor 
α 
 
 
Liquidity 
Sadka 
(4) 
 
Four Factor 
α 
 
 
 
Momentum 
1.04 1.02 1.00 0.93 1 (2.83) (2.78) (2.65) (2.69) 
0.03 0.001 0.03 0.02 
Market 
Competition 
Quintile 5 (0.13) (0.00) (0.15) (0.05) 
 
Panel B. Hedge Portfolio Returns — Independent Sorts 
 
 
(1) 
 
Three Factor  
α 
 
 
Table 4  
Panel A 
(2) 
 
Four Factor  
α 
 
Liquidity 
Pastor- 
Stambaugh 
(3) 
 
Four Factor 
α 
 
 
Liquidity 
Sadka 
(4) 
 
Four Factor 
α 
 
 
 
Momentum 
0.88 0.87 0.83 0.67 1 (2.31) (2.27) (2.12) (1.83) 
–0.10 –0.02 –0.11 –0.06 
Market 
Competition 
Quintile 5 (–0.24) (–0.04) (–0.26) (–0.14) 
 
 
